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Abstract
This work investigates the problem of demand privacy against colluding users for shared-link
coded caching systems, where no subset of users can learn any information about the demands of
the remaining users. The notion of privacy used here is stronger than similar notions adopted in past
work and is motivated by the practical need to insure privacy regardless of the file distribution. This
paper provides both an achievable scheme, referred to as Linear Function Retrieval for Demand Privacy
against Colluding Users (LFR-DPCU), and a novel information theoretic converse bound. By comparing
the performance of the achievable scheme with the converse bound derived in this paper (for the small
cache size regime) and existing converse bounds without privacy constraints, the communication load
of LFR-DPCU turns out to be optimal to within a constant multiplicative gap in all parameter regimes.
Numerical results show that LFR-DPCU outperforms known schemes based on the idea of virtual
users, which also satisfy the stronger notion of user privacy adopted here, in some regime. Moreover,
LFR-DPCU enjoys much lower subpacketization than known schemes based on virtual users.
Index Terms
Coded caching; colluding users; demand privacy; converse bound; linear function retrieval; sub-
packetization;
I. INTRODUCTION
Coded caching is a promising technique to reduce network congestion during peak times.
Consider a shared-link network consisting of a server having access to a library of N files
and being connected to K users, each equipped with a local cache memory of size M files.
The network operates in two phases: the placement phase happens when the network is not
congested, during which the server pushes some content into each user’s local cache without
knowing their future demands; while the delivery phase happens at peak times, during which
each user demands one file from the server and the server responds by sending a signal to
satisfy the users’ demands. In coded caching, the communication load (or just load for short in
the following) is reduced by creating multicast opportunities in the delivery phase by cleverly
pushing content in the caches in the placement phase.
Information theoretic coded caching was first introduced in [1] by Maddha-Ali and Niesen
(MAN). The MAN scheme was proved to achieve the optimal worst-case load among all
uncoded placement schemes when N ≥ K in [2]. By removing redundant transmissions in
the MAN scheme, the optimal load-memory tradeoff among all uncoded placement schemes
was characterized for N < K in [3]. Improved achievable loads by using coded placement were
obtained in [4]–[6] and the original cut-set converse bound in [1] was improved upon in [7], [8];
we know however that uncoded placement is no more than a factor of 2 away from optimal [9].
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2Decoding the MAN multicast signals however requires global knowledge of the demanded
files by the users, thus infringing the privacy of the users. Moreover, users may learn the content
of files other than the requested one, thus threatening security. Information theoretic secure coded
caching has been considered in [10], [11]; in [10], a wiretapper who observes the transmitted
signal can not learn any information about the files; in [11], each user can not obtain any
information on non-demanded files. Information theoretic demand-private coded caching was
formalized in [12], where the aim is to guarantee that each user does not learn any information
about the indices of the files demanded by the other users. Relevant for this work is a way to
insure privacy informally referred to as scheme with virtual users, an idea that first appeared
in [14] and was later analyzed in [12], [13]. The idea is that a private scheme for a system with
K users and N files can be constructed from known non-private schemes [1], [3] for NK users
and N files, that is, by introducing K(N − 1) virtual users. In the placement phase of a virtual
users scheme, the users choose their cache contents from the NK caches of the non-private
scheme without replacement, privately and randomly; in the delivery phase, the demands of the
K users are extended to demands for NK users (including K real users and N(K − 1) virtual
users) such that each file is demanded exactly K times. The server sends multicast signals to
satisfy the extended demands of NK users according to the non-private coded caching scheme.
Privacy of the real users is guaranteed since each real user can not distinguish the demands of
real and virtual users. The general idea of transforming a non-private coded caching scheme for
NK users to a private one for K users was further studied in [15], [16], and later extended
to device-to-device network in [17], where a trusted server having no access to the file library
coordinates the transmission among the users.
A. Paper Contributions
In this paper, we investigate the problem of demand privacy against colluding users (DPCU).
In DPCU, privacy is guaranteed in the sense that any subset of colluding users, who may share
their cache contents, can not learn any information about the indices of the files demanded by
the remaining users. It was noted already in [12] that existing schemes that were not designed to
fight colluding users are indeed private against colluding users as well. In this paper we further
strengthen the privacy notion of [12] by imposing that a feasible scheme should work for any
file realization. This notion is motivated by the fact that, in practical systems, the distribution of
files are usually hard to characterize, or even known, they may not be identically and uniformly
distributed, as many theoretical models assume.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
• We propose an achievable scheme referred to as linear function retrieval for demand privacy
against colluding users (LFR-DPCU). LFR-DPCU is based on the idea of linear function
retrieval in coded caching [18]. In [18], the optimal scheme for single file retrieval under
uncoded placement in [3] was extended to the more general setup where each user can
retrieve any linear combination of the files. The LFR-DPCU starts with the same file split
and placement strategy as in MAN [1], [18]. In addition, each user privately caches a “key”
that is formed as a random linear combination of the uncached subfiles under the MAN
strategy. In the delivery phase, the server broadcasts multicast signals so that each user can
decode a linear combination of the subfiles, which can be thought of as containing a desired
subfile protected by the local private “key.”
• We derive an information theoretic converse bound for the novel privacy definition, which
outperforms known bounds for the small memory regime when N > K. The converse
3is inspired by the approach in [16], which characterized the exact load-memory tradeoff
for the case N = K = 2. In particular, we derive a lower bound on the sum of some
entropies conditioned on known demands, which in turn provides a bound on a weighted
sum of the load and the memory size. We combine different entropy functions by the using
the fact that entropy function is submodular. We also leverage the fact that demands, in
the conditioning of the entropy terms, can be changed to other demands in the process
of combining conditional entropy terms, which enables us to tighten the bound as one
can argue that “more files can be decoded after combining.” Changing the demands in the
conditioning is possible because of the DPCU requirements.
• By using our novel converse bound with privacy combined with known bounds without
privacy constraints [9], we show that the LFR-DPCU scheme is optimal to within a constant
multiplicative gap in all parameter regimes. Numerical results indicate that LFR-DPCU
outperforms the virtual users scheme of [13] when the library size N is larger than 2K +1
and the memory size M is smaller than N − 1 − 1
K
. Thus, even in the stronger sense of
privacy used here, the virtual users scheme can be improved upon when N is much larger
than K.
It is also worth pointing out the superiority of LFR-DPCU compared to virtual users schemes
in terms of subpacketization. It is well known that, with fixed number of files and cache
size at each user, the subpacketization of MAN-type schemes increase exponentially with
the number of users K [19], [20]. This problem is even more prominent in virtual users
schemes as they are obtained from non-private coded caching schemes with KN users.
Since LFR-DPCU does not introduce virtual users, the subpacketization does not increase
compared to the (not private) MAN scheme. In other words, privacy need not come at the
expense of subpacketization.
B. Paper Organization
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the problem formulation and Sec-
tion III presents the LFR-DPCU scheme. Section IV-A contains the derivation of our novel
converse bound and shows that LFR-DPCU is order optimal. Section V presents some numerical
results. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper. Some proofs can be found in Appendix.
C. Notation
In this paper, we use R+ to denote the set of non-negative real numbers. The notation F2
denotes the binary field. For a positive integer n, Fn2 is the n dimensional vector space over the
field F2, and [n] is the set of the first n positive integers {1, 2, . . . , n}. For a sequence of variables
Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn and an index set S ⊆ [n], we use the notation ZS , {Zi : i ∈ S} and Z[0] , ∅. If
A is a matrix with n columns, AS denotes the submatrix that consists of columns in S ⊆ [n]. For
integers m,n, we use
(
n
m
)
to denote the binomial coefficient n!
m!(n−m)!
, and adopt the convention(
n
m
)
= 0 if m > n. The notation “ ⊕ ” is used to denote the Exclusive OR (XOR) operation.
We use Pr{·} to denote the probability of an event. In the proofs of chain (in)equalities, we
specify the relevant equations needed to justify the steps by the equation numbers on top of the
(in)equality symbols.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Let N,K,B be positive integers. An (N,K) caching system consists of a server with N files
W1,W2, . . . ,WN and K users 1, 2, . . . , K, where the server is connected to the users via an
4error-free shared link. The N files are independently and uniformly distributed1 over FB2 . Each
user k ∈ [K] has a memory of MB bits2, for some M ∈ [0, N ]. Since in the case N = 1 or
K = 1, there is no problem of protecting privacy, we assume that N ≥ 2 and K ≥ 2 throughout
this paper. The system operates in two phases as follows.
Placement Phase: The server privately generates a random variable P from some probability
space P . Then it fills the cache of each user k ∈ [K] by using the cache function
ϕk : P × F
NB
2 7→ F
MB
2 . (1)
The content of user k is denoted by
Zk = ϕk(P,W[N ]), ∀ k ∈ [K]. (2)
Delivery Phase: Each user k ∈ [K] demands the file indexed by Dk, where D1, D2, . . . , DK
are independently distributed over [N ]. The files W[N ], the randomness P and the demands D[K]
are independent, that is,
H(D[K], P,W[N ]) =
∑
k∈[K]
H(Dk) +H(P ) +
∑
n∈[N ]
H(Wn). (3)
Given the demands, the server creates the signal X by using the encoding function
φ : P × [N ]K × FNB2 7→ F
RB
2 , (4)
for some R ≥ 0, that is, the server transmits to the users via the shared link the signal
X = φ(P,D[K],W[N ]). (5)
The quantity R is called the worst-case load of the system.
Each user k ∈ [K] must decode its demanded file WDk bu using (X,Zk), and privacy must be
guaranteed against colluding users, that is, a working coded caching scheme for DPCU requires
[Correctness] H(WDk |X,Dk, Zk) = 0, ∀ k ∈ [K], (6)
[Privacy] I(D[K]\S;X,DS , ZS |W[N ]) = 0, ∀S ⊆ [K],S 6= ∅. (7)
Definition 1. A memory-load pair (M,R) ∈ R2+ is said to be achievable if there exists a scheme
such that all the above conditions are satisfies. The optimal worst-case load-memory tradeoff is
defined as
R∗(M) = lim inf
B→+∞
{R : (M,R) is achievable}. (8)
Our main objective is to characterize the optimal worst-case memory-load tradeoff R∗(M) in
Definition 1. By doing so we will also discuss the subpacketization of the proposed achievable
scheme, where the subpacketization of a scheme is the minimum value of B needed to realize
the scheme.
Remark 1. The intuition behind the privacy guarantee in (7) is that, for any file realization
W[N ] = w[N ] and for any non-empty set of users S ⊆ [K], the colluding users in S can not learn
any information on the demands of the other users. Thus, the privacy is guaranteed irrespective of
1In the results of this paper, the achievable scheme works for arbitrary distribution of W[N], but the converse relies on this
assumption.
2We implicitly assume that B is sufficient large so that MB and RB (see (4)) are integers.
5file realizations and the subset of users participating the collusion. By the fact that the demands
D[K] are independent of the files W[N ] (see (3)), the privacy condition in (7) is equivalent to
I(D[K]\S ; X,DS , ZS ,W[N ]) = 0, ∀S ⊆ [K],S 6= ∅. (9)
Remark 2. There have been several different definitions of demand privacy in the literature.
In [12], it assumed that the server can privately transmit to any subset of users by encryption
using shared keys, thus the privacy condition is
[Privacy in [12]] I(D[K]\{k}; X˜k, Dk, Zk) = 0,
where X˜k is the signal intended to be used for decoding by user k ∈ [K]. Other definitions
include
[Privacy in [15]] I(Dj;X,Dk, Zk) = 0, ∀(j, k) ∈ [K]
2 : j 6= k,
or
[Privacy in [13], [16]] I(D[K]\{k};X,Dk, Zk) = 0, ∀k ∈ [K],
where the latter is the strongest privacy condition used in past work and is obviously implied
by our equivalent privacy condition in (9).
The definitions of privacy in this Remark involve one user at a time, that is, users are not
assumed to be able to collude. Demand privacy against colluding users was first introduced in the
device-to-device setup [17], where the privacy condition there was defined without conditioning
on the library files W[N ]. The following Example 1 from [16] illustrates that the condition
I(D[K]\{k};X,Dk, Zk) = 0 can not guarantee privacy for arbitrary distribution of W[N ].
Example 1 (A scheme from [16] for the case N > K). Consider an (N,K) caching system where
N > K and the files are uniformly and independently distributed over FB2 . Let M ∈ [0, N ].
In the placement phase, the server generates
P = (T1, . . . , TK , S1, . . . , SK , V1, . . . , VK), (10)
where (T1, . . . , TK) is a random permutation of [K], which is uniformly drawn from all permu-
tations of the set [K]; the K identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) random variables
S1, . . . , SK are uniformly drawn from [K]; finally, V1, . . . , VK are i.i.d. random variables uni-
formly drawn from F
(1−M/N)B
2 . The three parts T[K], S[K] and V[K] are independently generated.
Each file is split into two parts as Wn = (W
(c)
n ,W
(u)
n ), n ∈ [N ], where W
(c)
n is of size
M
N
B bits,
and W
(u)
n is of size (1− MN )B bits. Each user k ∈ [K] caches Zk =
(
Sk,W
(c)
[N ]
)
, where we refer
to Sk as the key of user k ∈ [K].
In the delivery phase, for demands D1, . . . , DK , the server first generates a sequence of
numbers J1, . . . , JK inductively as follows
Ji =
{
Jj , if Di = Dj for some j < i
Ti, if Di 6= Dj , ∀ j < i
, (11)
and then sends a signal X = (Q[K], Y[K]), where Q[K] and P[K] are recursively generated as
Qj = (Jj + Sj)(K), ∀ j ∈ [K]. (12)
Yj =
{
W
(u)
Di
, if j = Pi for some i ∈ [K]
Vj , otherwise
, ∀ j ∈ [K], (13)
6where (·)(K) is the module operation defined as (nK + j)(K) = j for j = 1, 2, . . . , K and
any integer n. The “side information” Jk records the position of the packet W
(u)
Dk
in Y . Since
user k has the key Sk, it can find the position of packet W
(u)
Dk
from Qk, and hence it can
decode its missing packetW
(u)
Dk
. Moreover, it was proved in [16] that I(D[K]\{k};X,Dk, Zk) = 0,
where the proof relies on the fact that (Y1, . . . , YK ,W
(c)
1 , . . . ,W
(c)
N ) is uniformly distributed over
F
MB+K(1−M/N)B
2 , and is independent of (D[K], Q[K], Sk, Jk) for each k ∈ [K].
Intuitively, the privacy guarantee relies on the fact that the user k can not distinguish if the
signal Yj is a random generated vector Vj or some partial file in W
(u)
[N ]\{Dk}
, since both of them
are i.i.d. uniformly distributed over FB2 and independent of the cached packets W
(c)
[N ]. In many
practical applications, true file distributions maybe unavailable, or even they are available, the
N files may have different distributions or not independent of the cached packets W
(c)
[N ]. In such
cases, the user may infer some information on the demands. Obviously, the scheme does not
satisfy our privacy condition in (7).
III. LINEAR FUNCTION RETRIEVAL FOR DEMAND PRIVACY AGAINST COLLUDING USERS
We propose here an achievable scheme, which we refer to as Linear Function Retrieval
for Demand Privacy against Colluding Users (LFR-DPCU). We first state the result, then in
Section III-A we provide an illustrative example to highlight the key ingredients of the scheme
and finally in Section III-B we describe and analyze the general LFR-DPCU scheme.
Theorem 1. For an (N,K) DPCU caching system, the lower convex envelop of the point
(M ′0, R
′
0) , (0, N) and the following points is achievable
(Mt, Rt) ,
(
1 +
t(N − 1)
K
,
(
K
t+1
)
−
(
K−min{N−1,K}
t+1
)
(
K
t
) ), t ∈ [0 : K]. (14)
Moreover, the point (0, N) can be achieved with subpacketization 1, and the point (Mt, Rt) can
be achieved with subpacketization Bt ,
(
K
t
)
, t ∈ [0 : K].
Proof: For the point (M,R) = (0, N), the server can trivially transmit all the N files to the
users, obviously this scheme satisfies both the correctness and the privacy condition. For t = K,
the result is trivial, since all users can cache all the files. For t ∈ [0 : K − 1], we prove the
theorem by analyzing the performance of the scheme in Section III-B. The other points on the
lower convex envelope can be achieved by memory-sharing between those points.
Before we give the details of the scheme, we illustrate the idea behind the LFR-DPCU scheme
through an example.
A. Example for (N,K) = (3, 2)
Consider an (N,K) = (3, 2) caching system with t = 1. Let the three files be W1,W2,W3.
Firstly, split each file into two equal-size packets, i.e., W1 = {W1,1,W1,2}, W2 = {W2,1,W2,2}
and W3 = {W3,1,W3,2}.
In the placement phase, the server first generates two vectors p1 = (p1,1, p1,2, p1,3)
⊤ and
p2 = (p2,1, p2,2, p2,3)
⊤, which are uniformly and independently drawn from { (1, 0, 0)⊤, (0, 1, 0)⊤,
(0, 0, 1)⊤, (1, 1, 1)⊤}, i.e., the set of binary vectors of length 3 whose Hamming weight is odd.
Then the server generates two keys S1 and S2, one for each user, as follows
S1 = p1,1W1,2 ⊕ p1,2W2,2 ⊕ p1,3W3,2, (15)
7S2 = p2,1W1,1 ⊕ p2,2W2,1 ⊕ p2,3W3,1. (16)
The contents of the caches are given by
Z1 = {W1,1,W2,1,W3,1, S1}, (17)
Z2 = {W1,2,W2,2,W3,2, S2}. (18)
In the delivery phase, assume user 1 demands W1 and and user 2 demands W2. In the non-
private MAN scheme, the server sends the signal W1,2 ⊕W2,1. In the LFR-DPCU scheme, the
server sends
X = (Q, Y ), (19)
Q =

 p1,1 ⊕ 1 p2,1p1,2 p2,2 ⊕ 1
p1,3 p2,3

 , (20)
Y = (W1,2 ⊕ S1)⊕ (W2,1 ⊕ S2). (21)
Notice that
W1,2 ⊕ S1 = (p1,1 ⊕ 1)W1,2 ⊕ p1,2W2,2 ⊕ p1,3W3,2, (22)
W2,1 ⊕ S2 = p2,1W1,1 ⊕ (p2,2 ⊕ 1)W2,1 ⊕ p2,3W3,1. (23)
By (17) and (22) (resp. (18) and (23)), user 1 (resp. 2) can computeW2,1⊕S2 (resp.W1,2⊕S1) by
using the second (resp. first) column ofQ and the contents of its cache. Hence user 1 and 2 decode
their un-cached packet respectively. The privacy is guaranteed since each user does not know the
key of the other user, and the two columns of Q are uninformly and independently distributed
over {(0, 0, 0)⊤, (1, 1, 0)⊤, (1, 0, 1)⊤, (0, 1, 1)⊤}, i.e., the set of binary vectors of length 3 whose
Hamming weight is even.
Notice that each user caches 4 packets, each of size B
2
bits. In the signal X , the main payload
Y is a coded packet of length B
2
and the matrix Q can be sent in H(Q) = 2 log2 4 = 4 bits,
which does not scale with B. Thus, the scheme achieves the memory-load pair (M,R) =
(
2, 1
2
)
.
Remark 3. It can be observed from the example in this Section that, compared to the non-private
MAN scheme [1], the file are partitioned in the same way. The placement phase is similar to
MAN; in addition, each user also caches a random linear combination of the uncached packets
under the MAN placement, which is used as a key. The placement is thus not uncoded. In
the delivery phase, the server broadcasts a coded signal so that each user can decode a linear
combination of files as per the scheme in [18]. The linear combination is designed such that
each user can decode its demanded file with its cached key. Recall that in an (N,K) non-private
caching system [3], the optimal worst-case load with uncoded placement is given by the lower
convex envelope of the points (M˜t, R˜t), where
M˜t =
tN
K
, R˜t =
(
K
t+1
)
−
(
K−min{N,K}
t+1
)
(
K
t
) , t ∈ [0 : K]. (24)
By comparing (14) with (24), it can be observed that the cache size here is larger than in the
MAN scheme (by 1− t
K
), and the privacy is guaranteed with same or even better load (as (14)
is a function of N − 1 while (24) of N). The additional cache size is used to cache a key.
We are now ready to describe the general LFR-DPCU scheme.
8B. The LFR-DPCU Scheme
Let t ∈ [0 : K]
Ωt , {T : T ⊆ [K], |T | = t}. (25)
For fixed t ∈ [0 : K − 1], the system operates as follows.
Placement Phase: The server partitions the file Wn into
(
K
t
)
equal-size packets denoted as
Wn =
{
Wn,T : T ∈ Ωt
}
, ∀ n ∈ [N ]. (26)
The server uniformly and independently generates K vectors p1, . . . ,pK from the set of all
vectors in FN2 with odd Hamming weights, i.e.,
pk , (pk,1, . . . , pk,N)
⊤ ∼ Unif
{
(x1, . . . , xN)
⊤ ∈ FN2 :
⊕
n∈[N ]
xn = 1
}
, ∀ k ∈ [K]. (27)
The server fills the cache of user k ∈ [K] as
Zk =
{
Wn,T : T ∈ Ωt, k ∈ T , n ∈ [N ]
}
(28a)
∪
{ ⊕
n∈[N ]
pk,n ·Wn,T : T ∈ Ωt, k /∈ T
}
. (28b)
The random variable P is given in the form of the N ×K matrix
P = [p1,p2, . . . ,pK ]. (29)
Delivery Phase: Let e1, . . . , eN be the stardard unit vectors in F
N
2 , i.e., en is the vector such
that the n-th entry is one and all other entries are zeros. After receiving the users’ demands
D[K], the server generates the N ×K matrix
Q = [q1, . . . , qK ] (30)
as follows
qk = pk ⊕ eDk = (qk,1, qk,2, . . . , qk,N)
⊤, ∀ k ∈ [K], (31)
where the XOR operation is performed element-wise.
Denote the rank of Q over the binary field F2 by L = rank2(Q). Let L be a fixed subset of
[K] of size L such that rank2(QL) = rank2(Q) = L. The set L can be arbitrary chosen given
Q. Define
YS ,
⊕
j∈S
⊕
n∈[N ]
qk,n ·Wn,S\{j}, ∀S ∈ Ωt+1. (32)
The server transmits the signal
X = (L, Q, Y ) (33)
to all the users, where
Y ,
{
YS : S ∈ Ωt+1,S ∩ L 6= ∅
}
. (34)
Proof of Correctness: By (28a), each user k ∈ [K] needs to decode its demanded packets that
were not cached. For each packet WDk,T such that k /∈ T , user k can decode WDk,T from the
9signal YT ∪{k}, since by (31) and (32), we can express
YT ∪{k} = WDk,T (35a)
⊕
⊕
n∈[N ]
pk,n ·Wn,T (35b)
⊕
⊕
j∈T
⊕
n∈[N ]
qj,n ·Wn,T ∪{k}\{j}, (35c)
where the term in (35b) is a cached key (see (28b)), while all packets and all coefficients
in (35c) are cached (see (28a)) or sent via Q (see (33)). Thus, WDk ,T in (35a) can be decoded
from YT ∪{k}.
We still need to prove that each user can obtain all the signals
{YS : S ∈ Ωt+1,S ∩ L = 0}, (36)
which are not included in Y (see (34)). We note that the signals YS in (32) in the main payload
are exactly the same as in the non-private case where each user k demands the following linear
combination of the files [18] ⊕
n∈[N ]
qk,n ·Wn. (37)
It has been proved in [18] that, the signals in (36) can be obtained by linear combinations of
those in (34). For completeness, we briefly describe how to do so.
Let ΓB be the family of subsets V ⊆ B such that |V| = rank2(QV) = L for any B ⊆ [K].
Then the following lemma was proved in [18].
Lemma 1 ( [18, Lemma 1]). Let t ∈ [K] such that t + 1 + L ≤ K, for any B ⊆ [K] such that
|B| = t + 1 + L, consider any n ∈ [N ], T ⊆ B such that |T | = t, the number of V ∈ ΓB such
that the packet Wn,T shows up in the signal YB\V is even.
By Lemma 1, let B = L ∪ S, then ⊕
V∈ΓS∪L
YS∪L\V = 0, (38)
and therefore, YS can be obtained as
YS =
⊕
V∈ΓS∪L,V6=L
YS∪L\V . (39)
Proof of Privacy: We prove the scheme satisfy the equivalent condition in (9). In fact, for
any S ⊆ [K],
I(D[K]\S;X,DS , ZS ,W[N ]) (40a)
(33)
= I(D[K]\S;L, Q, Y,DS , ZSW[N ]) (40b)
(32),(34)
= I(D[K]\S;L, Q,DS , ZS ,W[N ]) (40c)
≤ I(D[K]\S;L, Q,DS , ZS ,pS ,W[N ]) (40d)
(28)
= I(D[K]\S;L, Q,DS ,pS ,W[N ]) (40e)
= I(D[K]\S;DS ,pS ,W[N ]) + I(D[K]\S;Q |DS ,pS ,W[N ])
10
+I(D[K]\S;L |Q,DS,pS ,W[N ]) (40f)
= I(D[K]\S;Q |DS ,pS ,W[N ]) (40g)
(30)
= I(D[K]\S; qS , q[K]\S |DS ,pS ,W[N ]) (40h)
(31)
= I(D[K]\S; q[K]\S |DS ,pS ,W[N ]) (40i)
= H(q[K]\S |DS ,pS ,W[N ])−H(q[K]\S |D[K],pS ,W[N ]) (40j)
= H(q[K]\S)−H(p[K]\S |D[K],pS ,W[N ]) (40k)
= H(q[K]\S)−H(p[K]\S) (40l)
= 0, (40m)
where in (40g) we used (3) and the fact that (D[K],pS ,W[N ]) → Q → L forms a Markov
chain; (40k) holds because q[K]\S are independent of (DS ,pS ,W[N ]) and q[K]\S and p[K]\S
determines each other givenD[K]\S; and (40m) holds because q1, . . .qK are uniformly distributed
over all even Hamming weight vectors of FN2 and p1, . . . ,pK are uniformly distributed over all
odd Hamming weight vectors of FN2 by construction.
Performance: By (26), each file is equally split into
(
K
t
)
packets, each of size B/
(
K
t
)
bits,
thus the subpacketization is
(
K
t
)
. Moreover, by (28), the number of packets cached by each user
is N
(
K−1
t−1
)
+
(
K−1
t
)
, thus the memory size is
Mt =
1
B
·
(
N
(
K − 1
t− 1
)
+
(
K − 1
t
))
·
B(
K
t
)
=
K + t(N − 1)
K
. (41)
By (32) and (34), the main payload Y contains
(
K
t+1
)
−
(
K−rank2(Q)
t+1
)
packets, each of size B/
(
K
t
)
bits. Notice that the set L and the matrix Q can be sent in K and NK bits, respectively. By (27)
and (31), q1, q2, . . . , qK are uniformly and independently distributed over an N −1 dimensional
subspace of FN2 . Thus, the worst-case is rank2(Q) = min{N − 1, K}. Therefore, the scheme
achieves the worst-case load
Rt = lim inf
B→∞
1
B
(((
K
t + 1
)
−
(
K −min{N − 1, K}
t + 1
))
·
B(
K
t
) +K +NK)
=
(
K
t+1
)
−
(
K−min{N−1,K}
t+1
)
(
K
t
) . (42)
This concludes the description of the general LFR-DPCU scheme.
Remark 4. The “single file” retrieval set-up analyzed so far can be extended to the “linear
function” retrieval setup studied in [18]. In this more general setup, the files W1, . . . ,WN are
uniformly distributed over FBq , for some prime power q, and each demand Dk takes the form
of dk = (dk,1, . . . , dk,N) ∈ F
N
q , which means that user k ∈ [K] wants to retrieve the linear
combination of the files
WDk ,
⊕
n∈[N ]
dk,n ·Wn, (43)
under the correctness constrain in (6) and the privacy constrain in (7), where the operations “⊕”
and “ · ” here denotes the addition and scaler-vector multiplication over the finite field FBq .
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The LFR-DPCU scheme can be adapted to linear function retrieval as follows:
1) The range of the independent and uniformly distributed vectors p1, . . . ,pK in (27) is now
F
N
q .
3
2) The vector eDk in (31) is replaced by dk.
3) rank2(Q) becomes rankq(Q), the rank of the matrix Q over the field Fq when choosing
the set L.
4) The correctness and privacy can be verified by defining
WDk,T ,
⊕
n∈[N ]
dk,n ·Wn,T , ∀ T ∈ Ωt, ∀ k ∈ [K], (44)
and by following the same lines of the proofs (note that Lemma 1 has been generalized
to the case where the files are over Fq in [18]). The performance analysis follows the
same lines except that the rank of matrix Q is given by rankq(Q) , min{N,K} since the
columns of Q are independent and uniformly distributed over FNq in this case, thus the
worst-case load in (42) is replaced by
R′t ,
(
K
t+1
)
−
(
K−min{N,K}
t+1
)
(
K
t
) . (45)
IV. CONVERSE AND OPTIMALITY
In this section, we first derive a converse bound in Section IV-A and then that the LFR-DPCU
scheme is order optimal in Section IV-B.
A. Converse Bound
In order to establish our converse, we need the following three lemmas. The proof of Lemma 3
and 4 are deferred to Appendix A and B respectively.
Lemma 2 (Submodularity of Entropy Functions [21]). Let X be a set of random variables. For
any X1,X2 ⊆ X ,
H(X1) +H(X2) ≥ H(X1 ∪ X2) +H(X1 ∩ X2). (46)
Lemma 3. For an (N,K) DPCU caching system, assume (M,R) ∈ R2+ is achievable; then, for
any ℓ ∈ [N ] and b ∈ [0 : min{ℓ,K}], and for sufficiently large B, the following holds
(R + ℓ ·M)B ≥ H(WBℓ , X, ZAb |DAb = dAb) (47)
for any Bℓ ⊆ [N ],Ab ⊆ [K] such that |Bℓ| = ℓ, |Ab| = b, and dAb = {dk : k ∈ Ab} is any b
distinct indices in Bℓ.
Lemma 4. For fixed ℓ ∈ [N − 1], define bℓ , min{ℓ,K − 1}, which satisfies bℓ ≤ min{ℓ,K}
and bℓ + 1 = min{ℓ+ 1, K} ≤ K. For any a ∈ [ℓ : N ] define
hℓ(a) ,
bℓ−1∑
j=0
H(W[a], X, Z[j] |D[j] = [j]) +H(W[a], Z[bℓ+1]). (48)
3Under linear combination file retrieval, we need to select columns of P uniformly and independent over all vectors of FNq .
In this case, we can not constrain them to something equivalent to “odd weight vectors” in the binary case because the demand
Dk may takes all vectors over F
N
q , so the query space (range of columns of Q) needs at least F
N
q distinct vectors. Therefore,
in this case, the worst-case load is slightly increased.
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Then for any a ∈ [ℓ : N − 1], the following holds
hℓ(a) +H(W[ℓ], X, Z[bℓ] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ]) ≥ hℓ(a+ 1) +H(W[ℓ]). (49)
We are now ready to present our novel converse result.
Theorem 2. For an (N,K) DPCU caching system, for anyM ∈ [0, N ], the optimal memory-load
tradeoff R∗(M) satisfies
R∗(M) ≥ max
ℓ∈[N ]
{
ℓ+
min{ℓ+ 1, K} · (N − ℓ)
N − ℓ+min{ℓ+ 1, K}
− ℓ ·M
}
. (50)
Proof: Notice that, for fixed ℓ ∈ [N − 1] and for sufficiently large B, we have
(N − ℓ + bℓ + 1)(R + ℓM)B (51a)
= bℓ(R + ℓM)B + (N − ℓ+ 1)(R + ℓM)B (51b)
(47)
≥
bℓ−2∑
j=0
H(W[ℓ], X, Z[j] |D[j] = [j]) +H(W[ℓ], X, Z[bℓ−1], Zbℓ+1 |D[bℓ−1] = [bℓ − 1], Dbℓ+1 = ℓ)
+(N − ℓ+ 1)H(W[ℓ], X, Z[bℓ] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ]) (51c)
(9)
=
bℓ−2∑
j=0
H(W[ℓ], X, Z[j] |D[j] = [j]) +H(W[ℓ], X, Z[bℓ−1], Zbℓ+1 |D[bℓ] = [bℓ], Dbℓ+1 = ℓ)
+H(W[ℓ], X, Z[bℓ] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ], Dbℓ+1 = ℓ) + (N − ℓ)H(W[ℓ], X, Z[bℓ] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ]) (51d)
(46)
≥
bℓ−2∑
j=0
H(W[ℓ], X, Z[j] |D[j] = [j]) +H(W[ℓ], X, Z[bℓ−1] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ], Dbℓ+1 = ℓ)
+H(W[ℓ], X, Z[bℓ+1] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ], Dbℓ+1 = ℓ) + (N − ℓ)H(W[ℓ], X, Z[bℓ] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ]) (51e)
≥
bℓ−2∑
j=0
H(W[ℓ], X, Z[j] |D[j] = [j]) +H(W[ℓ], X, Z[bℓ−1] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ], Dbℓ+1 = ℓ)
+H(W[ℓ], Z[bℓ+1] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ], Dbℓ+1 = ℓ) + (N − ℓ)H(W[ℓ], X, Z[bℓ] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ]) (51f)
(3),(9)
=
bℓ−2∑
j=0
H(W[ℓ], X, Z[j] |D[j] = [j]) +H(W[ℓ], X, Z[bℓ−1] |D[bℓ−1] = [bℓ − 1])
+H(W[ℓ], Z[bℓ+1]) + (N − ℓ)H(W[ℓ], X, Z[bℓ] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ]) (51g)
(48)
= hℓ(ℓ) + (N − ℓ)H(W[ℓ], X, Z[bℓ] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ]) (51h)
(49)
≥ hℓ(ℓ+ 1) + (N − ℓ− 1)H(W[ℓ], X, Z[bℓ] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ]) +H(W[ℓ]) (51i)
...
(49)
≥ hℓ(N) + (N − ℓ)H(W[ℓ]) (51j)
=
bℓ−1∑
j=0
H(W[N ], X, Z[j] |D[j] = [j]) +H(W[N ], Z[bℓ+1]) + (N − ℓ)H(W[ℓ]) (51k)
≥
bℓ−1∑
j=0
H(W[N ] |D[j] = [j]) +H(W[N ]) + (N − ℓ)H(W[ℓ]) (51l)
13
(9)
=
bℓ−1∑
j=0
H(W[N ]) +H(W[N ]) + (N − ℓ)H(W[ℓ]) (51m)
= (bℓ + 1)H(W[N ]) + (N − ℓ)H(W[ℓ]) (51n)
where, to get from (51i) to (51j), we recursively applied (49) by setting a = ℓ, ℓ+1, . . . , N − 1.
Finally, since the files are uniformly distributed over FB2 , we have H(W[N ]) = NB and thus
R ≥ ℓ+
min{ℓ+ 1, K} · (N − ℓ)
N − ℓ+min{ℓ+ 1, K}
− ℓ ·M (52)
holds for ℓ ∈ [N − 1]. Moreover, let ℓ = N , Bℓ = [N ] and Ab = ∅ in (47) to obtain
(R +NM)B ≥ H(W[N ], X) ≥ H(W[N ]) = NB. (53)
Thus the inequality (52) also holds for ℓ = N . Therefore, we proved (50).
B. Optimality of the LFR-DPCU Scheme
For clarity, we use R(M) to denote the achievable load of the LFR-DPCU scheme in Sec-
tion III-B, i.e., the lower convex envelope of the points defined in Theorem 1. The proof of the
following theorem is deferred to Appendix C.
Theorem 3. For an (N,K) DPCU caching system, the ratio of the achieved communication loads
of LFR-DPCU scheme R(M) and the optimal communication load R∗(M) is upper bounded by
R(M)
R∗(M)
≤


2, if 0 ≤M ≤ 1, N ≥ 2K
2, if 0 ≤M ≤ 1
2
, N < 2K
4, if 1
2
≤ M ≤ 1, N < 2K
4, if 1 ≤M ≤ N,N ≥ K(K+1)
2
4.0177, if 1 ≤M ≤ N,K < N < K(K+1)
2
5.4606, if 1 ≤M ≤ N,N ≤ K
. (54)
Remark 5. It was showed in [13] that the load achieved by the virtual users scheme in [13] is
optimal to within a multiplicative factor of 8 if N ≤ K, or of 4 if N > K and M ≥ N
K
, thus
leaving open the regime N > K,M < N
K
. Here, we show that the LRF-DPCU scheme is order
optimal in all regimes under the DPCU requirement, due to the new converse we derived in
Theorem 2.
Remark 6. The gap in Theorem 3 is obtained under the privacy definition in (7). It is worthy
pointing out that, at M = 0, the best known converse under other the privacy definitions in
Remark 1 is min{N,K}. It was noticed in [17] that the virtual users scheme [13] satisfies the
privacy against user colluding. Both LFR-DPCU and virtual users schemes achieve the load
R = N at M = 0. Thus, at M = 0, both LFR-DPCU and virtual users schemes achieve optimal
load under privacy definition (7), but unbounded gap when K > N under the other privacy
definitions in Remark 1.
V. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we numerically compare the performance of the LFR-DPCU scheme with
known schemes in [13] in terms of memory-load tradeoff and subpacketizations. As mentioned
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in Remark 6, the virtual users scheme in [13] in fact satisfies the DPCU condition (7). The
performances of non-private scheme in [3] are also presented for reference.
For clarity, we list in Table I the performance of the corner points of various schemes where,
in term of an integer parameter t whose range are in the second row, with the memory size
M one achieves load R and subpacketization B. We compare the schemes in the two regimes
N ≤ K and N > K, where we choose parameters (N,K) = (10, 30) and (N,K) = (30, 10).
For both cases, we plot two figures showing
(a) the load-memory tradeoff curves of the three schemes and the lower bounds in Theorem 2
and [9];
(b) the logarithm of subpacketization, i.e., log10B as a function of memory size M for the
corner points.
TABLE I: Comparison of Different Schemes
Scheme LFR-DPCU Virtual users [13] Non-private [3]
t 0 ≤ t ≤ K 0 ≤ t ≤ KN 0 ≤ t ≤ K
M 1 + t(N−1)
K
t
K
tN
K
R
( Kt+1)−(
K−min{K,N−1}
t+1 )
(Kt )
(KNt+1)−(
(K−1)N
t+1 )
(KNt )
( Kt+1)−(
K−min{N,K}
t+1 )
(Kt )
B
(
K
t
) (
KN
t
) (
K
t
)
The comparisons for N ≤ K and N > K are presented in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 respectively. By
comparing LFR-DPCU with the virtual users schemes, we note that
1) case N ≤ K (Fig. 1): the LFR-DPCU achieves worse load-memory tradeoff than the virtual
users scheme, which can approach almost the same performance as the non-private scheme.
However, the LFR-DPCU could maintain a similar subpacketization order as the non-
private scheme, while the virtual users scheme has a significantly larger subpacketization.
2) case N > K (Fig. 2): the LFR-DPCU outperforms the virtual users scheme in both load-
memory tradeoff and subpacketization.
We explain intuitively the results in Fig. 1(a) and 2(a) as follows. Both LFR-DPCU and the
virtual users schemes are based on the MAN uncoded placement scheme. In LFR-DPCU, in
addition each user caches some random linear combinations of uncached MAN subfiles. This
negative effect on load-memory tradeoff becomes less significant when the number of files N
becomes large. In the virtual users scheme, the server creates multicast signals to satisfy NK
users, which includes K real users and N(K − 1) virtual users, thus some multicast signals are
only useful for virtual users, which increases the load compared to the non-private scheme. This
negative effect on load-memory tradeoff becomes more significant when N becomes large.
The regime where LFR-DPCU outperforms the virtual users scheme can be found by the
following observations:
1) Both schemes achieve the point (0, N), and their slopes at M = 0 are −max
{
N −
K, 2N+1−K
N+K−1
}
and −N+1
2
respectively. When N = 2K + 1, the two slopes are equal, so
2K + 1 is the threshold of N such that the LFR-DPCU scheme outperforms the virtual
users scheme when M is close to 0.
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2) It was proved in [13] that for M ≥ N − 1
K
, the virtual users scheme achieves the cut-set
bound 1− M
N
, while LFR-DPCU achieves 1− M−1
N−1
when M ≥ N − N−1
K
. Thus, the virtual
users scheme eventually outperforms the LFR-DPCU scheme when M increases to N .
The load of virtual user scheme is given by
K(N−M)
KM+1
for M ∈
{
N − i
K
: i ∈ [0 : N − 1]
}
.
Therefore, if N ≥ K+2 and M = N−1− 1
K
, the loads of the two schemes are equal. So,
M = N−1− 1
K
is the threshold that the virtual users scheme outperforms the LFR-DPCU
scheme.
These observations together with extensive numerical results indicate that when N > 2K+1 and
0 < M < N − 1− 1
K
, the LFR-DPCU scheme outperforms the virtual user scheme. Notice that
for the regime N − 1 − 1
K
≤ M ≤ N , the multiplicative gap of LFR-DPCU scheme compared
to the cut-set bound 1− M
N
is N
N−1
, which is very close to one for large N .
It is worthy pointing out that, the LFR-DPCU scheme is within the multiplicative gap of
the optimal load-memory tradeoff by Theorem 3, even in the regime N ≤ K. From Fig. 1(b)
and 2(b), the LFR-DPCU has much lower subpacketization in all parameter regimes, since LFR-
DPCU scheme is designed to satisfy K users, instead of the NK users in virtual users schemes.
From Fig. 1(a) and 2(a), the bound derived in Theorem 2 outperforms the existing bound on
an interval beginning with M = 0 in the case N > K. From Theorem 3, we know that the lower
bound enable us to bound the performance of LFR-DPCU scheme with a constant multiplicative
gap over the interval [0, 1].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated a shared-link caching system where the demands of users must
be protected against any subset of colluding users. The proposed LFR-DPCU scheme is proved to
be order optimal in all parameter regimes. The LFR-DPCU scheme outperforms existing virtual
users schemes in some parameter regime and has much lower subpacketization.
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Fig. 1: Performance comparison for an (N,K) = (10, 30) system.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 3
We first prove that the conclusion holds for the case b = min{ℓ,K} by induction on ℓ.
For ℓ = b = 1. Let B1 = {n} and A1 = {k} for some n ∈ [N ] and k ∈ [K].
H(Wn, X, Zk |Dk = n) (55)
(6)
= H(X,Zk |Dk = n) (56)
≤ H(X|Dk = n) +H(Zk|Dk = n) (57)
(9),(3)
= H(X) +H(Zk) (58)
≤ (R +M)B. (59)
Thus, the conclusion holds for ℓ = 1.
Now, assume that the conclusion holds for ℓ where ℓ ∈ [N − 1]. Consider the case ℓ+ 1, let
b′ = min{ℓ+1, K}. Let Bℓ+1 and Ab′ be any subset of [N ] and [K] with cardinalities ℓ+1 and
b′ respectively. Let dAb′ be the demands of users in Ab′ , which can be any distinct demands in
Bℓ+1. We have
1) if ℓ < K, then b′ = b+ 1 = ℓ+ 1, pick any k ∈ Ab+1.
(R + (ℓ+ 1) ·M)B (60)
= (R + ℓ ·M)B +MB (61)
≥ H(WBℓ+1\{dk}, X, ZAb+1\{k} |DAb+1\{k} = dAb+1\{k}) +H(Zk) (62)
(9),(3)
= H(WBℓ+1\{dk}, X, ZAb+1\{k} |DAb+1 = dAb+1) +H(Zk | DAb+1 = dAb+1) (63)
≥ H(WBℓ+1\{dk}, X, ZAb+1 |DAb+1 = dAb+1) (64)
(6)
= H(WBℓ+1, X, ZAb+1 |DAb+1 = dAb+1), (65)
where (62) follows from the induction assumption.
2) if ℓ ≥ K, then b′ = b = K < ℓ + 1 and Ab′ = Ab = [K]. Pick any n ∈ Bℓ+1\d[K] and
k ∈ [K], let d′[K] = {d
′
j : j ∈ [K]} be another demand of users such that
d′j =


dj, if j 6= k
n, if j = k
. (66)
Then,
(R + (ℓ+ 1) ·M)B (67)
= (R + ℓ ·M)B +MB (68)
≥ H(WBℓ+1\{dk}, X, Z[K] |D[K] = d
′
[K]) +H(Zk) (69)
≥ H(WBℓ+1\{dk}, X, Z[K]\{k} |D[K] = d
′
[K]) +H(Zk) (70)
(9),(66),(3)
= H(WBℓ+1\{dk}, X, Z[K]\{k} |D[K] = d[K]) +H(Zk |D[K] = d[K]) (71)
≥ H(WBℓ+1\{dk}, X, Z[K] |D[K] = d[K]) (72)
(6)
= H(WBℓ+1, X, Z[K] |D[K] = d[K]), (73)
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where (69) follows from the induction assumption.
Therefore, the conclusion holds for b = min{ℓ,K}.
For the case b < min{ℓ,K}, let A˜ ⊆ [K] be a subset of size min{ℓ,K} such that Ab ⊂ A˜
and d˜ = {dj : j ∈ Ab} ∪ {dj : j ∈ A˜\Ab} be a distinct demand of users in A˜ such that
1) it has consistent demands on the users in Ab;
2) the extended demands {dj : j ∈ A˜\Ab} ⊆ Bℓ\{dj : j ∈ Ab}.
Then by the conclusion for the case b = min{ℓ,K}, for sufficiently large B,
(R + ℓ ·M)B (74)
≥ H(WBℓ , X, ZA˜ |DA˜ = dA˜) (75)
≥ H(WBℓ , X, ZAb |DA˜ = dA˜) (76)
(9)
= H(WBℓ , X, ZAb |DAb = dAb). (77)
B. Proof of Lemma 4
By the definition of hℓ(a) in (48), we have
hℓ(a) +H(W[ℓ], X, Z[bℓ] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ]) (78)
=
bℓ−1∑
j=0
H(W[a], X, Z[j] |D[j] = [j]) +H(W[a], Z[bℓ+1]) +H(W[ℓ], X, Z[bℓ] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ]) (79)
(3),(9)
=
bℓ−1∑
j=0
H(W[a], X, Z[j] |D[j] = [j])
+H(W[a], Z[bℓ+1] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ]) +H(W[ℓ], X, Z[bℓ] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ], Dbℓ+1 = a + 1)
(46)
≥
bℓ−1∑
j=0
H(W[a], X, Z[j] |D[j] = [j]) +H(W[ℓ], Z[bℓ] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ], Dbℓ+1 = a+ 1)
+H(W[a], X, Z[bℓ+1] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ], Dbℓ+1 = a + 1)
(6)
=
bℓ−1∑
j=0
H(W[a], X, Z[j] |D[j] = [j]) +H(W[ℓ], Z[bℓ] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ], Dbℓ+1 = a+ 1)
+H(W[a+1], X, Z[bℓ+1] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ], Dbℓ+1 = a+ 1) (80)
≥
bℓ−1∑
j=0
H(W[a], X, Z[j] |D[j] = [j]) +H(W[ℓ], Z[bℓ] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ], Dbℓ+1 = a+ 1)
+H(W[a+1], Z[bℓ+1] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ], Dbℓ+1 = a + 1) (81)
(3)
=
bℓ−1∑
j=0
H(W[a], X, Z[j] |D[j] = [j]) +H(W[ℓ], Z[bℓ]) +H(W[a+1], Z[bℓ+1]) (82)
Notice that, for any j ∈ [0 : bℓ − 1], we have
H(W[a], X, Z[j] |D[j] = j) +H(W[ℓ], Z[j+1]) (83)
(3),(9)
= H(W[a], X, Z[j] |D[j] = j,Dj+1 = a+ 1) +H(W[ℓ], Z[j+1] |D[j] = j,Dj+1 = a+ 1) (84)
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(46)
≥ H(W[a], X, Z[j+1] |D[j] = j,Dj+1 = a+ 1) +H(W[ℓ], Z[j] |D[j] = j,Dj+1 = a+ 1) (85)
(6)
= H(W[a+1], X, Z[j+1] |D[j] = j,Dj+1 = a+ 1) +H(W[ℓ], Z[j] |D[j] = j,Dj+1 = a + 1) (86)
≥ H(W[a+1], X, Z[j] |D[j] = j,Dj+1 = a+ 1) +H(W[ℓ], Z[j] |D[j] = j,Dj+1 = a+ 1) (87)
(3),(9)
= H(W[a+1], X, Z[j] |D[j] = j) +H(W[ℓ], Z[j]) (88)
Thus, we can continue with (82) as
hℓ(a) +H(W[ℓ], X, Z[bℓ] |D[bℓ] = [bℓ]) (89)
(88)
≥
bℓ−2∑
j=0
H(W[a], X, Z[j] |D[j] = [j]) +H(W[ℓ], Z[bℓ−1])
+H(W[a+1], X, Z[bℓ−1] |D[bℓ−1] = [bℓ − 1]) +H(W[a+1], Z[bℓ+1]) (90)
... (91)
≥ H(W[ℓ]) +
bℓ−1∑
j=0
H(W[a+1], X, Z[bℓ−1] |D[bℓ−1] = [bℓ − 1]) +H(W[a+1], Z[bℓ+1]) (92)
= hℓ(a+ 1) +H(W[ℓ]), (93)
where in (91), we recursively apply (88) to j = bℓ − 2, b− 3, . . . , 0 sequentially.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
We bound
R(M)
R∗(M)
for 0 ≤M ≤ 1 and 1 ≤M ≤ N separately.
1) Case 0 ≤ M ≤ 1: For clarity, we denote the function in the braces of (50) by f(M, ℓ),
i.e.,
f(M, ℓ) , ℓ+
min{ℓ+ 1, K} · (N − ℓ)
N − ℓ+min{ℓ+ 1, K}
− ℓ ·M, ∀ ℓ ∈ [N ],M ∈ [0, N ]. (94)
We further discuss in two subcases N ≥ 2K and N < 2K.
1) If N ≥ 2K, R(M) is upper bounded by the line segment connecting (M ′0, R
′
0) = (0, N)
and (M0, R0) = (1, K), i.e.,
R(M) ≤ L1(M) , N − (N −K)M, M ∈ [0, 1]. (95)
We further discuss in two sub-cases, i.e., 0 ≤ M ≤ 1− K
N
and 1− K
N
≤M ≤ 1.
a) If 0 ≤M ≤ 1− K
N
,
R(M)
R∗(M)
(50),(95)
≤
L1(M)
f(M,N)
(96)
≤
L1(1−
K
N
)
f(1− K
N
, N)
(97)
= 2−
K
N
(98)
< 2, (99)
where we utilized the fact that
L1(M)
f(M,N)
increases with M over
[
0, 1− K
N
]
.
21
b) If 1− K
N
≤ M ≤ 1,
R(M)
R∗(M)
(50),(95)
≤
L1(M)
f(M,K)
(100)
≤ max
M∈{1−K
N
,1}
{ L1(M)
f(M,K)
}
(101)
= max
M∈{1−K
N
,1}
{
N − (N −K)M
K +K(1− K
N
)−KM
}
, (102)
= max
{
2−
K
N
,
1
1− K
N
}
(103)
≤ 2. (104)
where (101) holds because for any fixed (N,K) such that N ≥ 2K, the linear
fractional function
L1(M)
f(M,K)
is either increasing or decreasing in M over
[
1 − K
N
, 1
]
,
and (104) follows from the fact K
N
≤ 1
2
.
2) If N < 2K, R(M) is upper bounded by the line segment connecting (M ′0, R
′
0) = (0, N)
and (M1, R1) = (1,min{N − 1, K}), i.e.,
R(M) ≤ L2(M) , N −max{1, N −K} ·M, M ∈ [0, 1]. (105)
We further discuss in two sub-cases, i.e., 0 ≤ M ≤ 1
2
and 1
2
< M ≤ 1.
a) If 0 ≤M < 1
2
,
R(M)
R∗(M)
(50),(105)
≤
L2(M)
f(M,N)
(106)
≤
L2(
1
2
)
f(1
2
, N)
(107)
= 2min
{
1−
1
2N
,
N +K
2N
}
(108)
< 2. (109)
where (107) holds because the function
L2(M)
f(M,N)
increases with M over
[
0, 1
2
]
.
b) If 1
2
< M ≤ 1,
R(M)
R∗(M)
(50),(105)
≤
L2(M)
f(M, ⌊N/2⌋)
(110)
=
N −max{1, N −K} ·M
⌊N/2⌋ + (⌊N/2⌋+1)(N−⌊N/2⌋)
N+1
− ⌊N/2⌋ ·M
(111)
<
N −max{1, N −K} ·M
(⌊N/2⌋+1)(N−⌊N/2⌋)
N+1
(112)
<
N + 1
⌊N/2⌋ + 1
·
N
N − ⌊N/2⌋
(113)
≤ 4, (114)
where in (114), we used the fact N
2
≥ ⌊N/2⌋ ≥ N
2
− 1
2
.
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2) Case 1 ≤ M ≤ N: Denote the optimal centralized and decentralized load for an (N,K)
caching system with memory size M at each user under uncoded placement without privacy
constraint by rC(M) and rD(M) respectively. By the results of [3], rC(M) is the lower convex
envelope of the points {(M˜t, R˜t) : t ∈ [0 : K]} in (24), and rD(M) is given by
rD(M) ,
N −M
M
(
1−
(
1−
M
N
)min{N,K})
, ∀M ∈ [0, N ]. (115)
Denote the optimal load for an (N,K) caching system with memory sizeM at each user without
privacy constraint by r∗(M). By the results in [9],
rC(M) ≤ rD(M) ≤


2.00884 · r∗(M), if N < K(K+1)
2
2 · r∗(M), if N ≥ K(K+1)
2
. (116)
Notice that the optimal load for DPCU is no less than that without privacy constraint, i.e.,
r∗(M) ≤ R∗(M), ∀M ∈ [0, N ]. (117)
We bound
R(M)
R∗(M)
for the subcases N > K and N ≤ K separately.
1) If N > K, we bound R(M)
R∗(M)
for the sub-cases (N,K) = (3, 2) and (N,K) 6= (3, 2)
separately.
a) If (N,K) = (3, 2), the lower convex envelope of the points (M ′0, R
′
0) = (0, 3),
(M0, R0) = (1, 2), (M1, R1) = (2,
1
2
) and (M2, R2) = (3, 0) is given by
R(M) =


3− 5
4
M, if 0 ≤M ≤ 2
3
2
− 1
2
M, if 2 ≤M ≤ 3
. (118)
By Theorem 2 and the cut set bound NR +M ≥ N (see [1]), we have R∗(M) ≥
1− 1
3
M , thus
i) If 1 ≤M ≤ 2,
R(M)
R∗(M)
≤
3− 5
4
M
1− 1
3
M
≤
21
8
< 4. (119)
ii) For 2 ≤M < 3,
R(M)
R∗(M)
≤
3
2
− 1
2
M
1− 1
3
M
=
3
2
< 4. (120)
b) If (N,K) 6= (3, 2), we prove the following inequality in Appendix D,
R(M)
rC(M)
≤ 2, ∀ 1 ≤M ≤ N. (121)
Therefore,
R(M)
R∗(M)
=
R(M)
rC(M)
·
rC(M)
r∗(M)
·
r∗(M)
R∗(M)
(122)
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(117),(121)
≤ 2 ·
rC(M)
r∗(M)
(123)
(116)
<


4, if N ≥ K(K+1)
2
4.0177, if K < N < K(K+1)
2
. (124)
2) If N ≤ K, we prove the following inequality in Appendix D,
R(M)
rD(M)
≤ e, ∀M ∈ [1, N ]. (125)
Therefore,
R(M)
R∗(M)
=
R(M)
rD(M)
·
rD(M)
r∗(M)
·
r∗(M)
R∗(M)
(126)
(116),(117),(125)
≤ e× 2.00884× 1 (127)
< 5.4606. (128)
D. Proof of Two Inequalities
For notational clarity, in this subsection, we will use rC(M,N,K) and rD(M,N,K) to denote
the optimal load of an (N,K) caching system without privacy constraint. We aim to prove the
inequalities (121) and (125), i.e.,
Lemma 5. For an (N,K) system,
1) If N > K and (N,K) 6= (2, 3),
R(M)
rC(M,N,K)
≤ 2, 1 ≤M ≤ N. (129)
2) If N ≤ K,
R(M)
rD(M,N,K)
≤ e, 1 ≤M ≤ N. (130)
Proof: By Theorem 1, for M ≥ 1, R(M) is uppper bounded by the lower convex envelope
of the points {(Mt, Rt) : t ∈ [0 : K]} in (14), which is exactly rC(M − 1, N − 1, K) by (24).
Thus, by (116), for 1 ≤M ≤ N ,
R(M) ≤ rC(M − 1, N − 1, K) ≤ rD(M − 1, N − 1, K). (131)
Therefore,
1) If N > K and (N,K) 6= (3, 2), since R(M) is convex inM , and rC(M,N,K) is piecewise
linear in M with corner points such that M ∈ {1}∪ { tN
K
: t ∈ [K]} over [1, N ], it suffices
to prove (129) for the cases M ∈ {1} ∪ { tN
K
: t = 1, 2, . . . , K}.
a) If M = 1, let θ = 1− K
N
, then M = 1 = θ · 0 + (1− θ)N
K
, thus
rC(1, N,K) = θ · rC(0, N,K) + (1− θ) · rC
(N
K
,N,K
)
(132)
=
(
1−
K
N
)
K +
K(K − 1)
2N
(133)
24
= K
(
1−
K + 1
2N
)
(134)
≥
K
2
, (135)
where we used the fact N ≥ K + 1. Thus,
R(1)
rC(1, N,K)
(131)
≤
rC(0, N − 1, K)
rC(1, N,K)
(135)
= 2. (136)
b) If M = N
K
and N = K +1, R(M) is upper bounded by the line segment connecting
(M ′0, R
′
0) = (0, N) and (M1, R1) = (
K+N−1
K
, K−1
2
), i.e.,
R(M) ≤ L3(M) , N −
K(2N + 1−K)
2(K +N − 1)
M, ∀M ∈
[
0,
K +N − 1
K
]
. (137)
Thus,
R(N
K
)
rC(
N
K
, N,K)
(24),(137)
≤
N − K(2N+1−K)
2(K+N−1)
· N
K
K−1
2
=
3(K + 1)
2K
≤ 2, (138)
where we used the fact K ≥ 3 since (N,K) 6= (3, 2).
c) If M = tN
K
, where t ≥ 2 or N ≥ K + 2 hold, we have
M − 1 = θ
((t− 1)(N − 1)
K
)
+ (1− θ)
(t(N − 1)
K
)
, (139)
where θ = K−t
N−1
< 1. Thus,
R(M)
rC(M,N,K)
(140)
(131)
≤
rC(M − 1, N − 1, K)
rC(M,N,K)
(141)
(139)
=
θ · rC
( (t−1)(N−1)
K
, N − 1, K
)
+ (1− θ) · rC
( t(N−1)
K
, N − 1, K
)
rC(M,N,K)
(142)
=
K−t
N−1
· K−t+1
t
+ N−1−K+t
N−1
· K−t
t+1
K−t
t+1
(143)
= 1 +
K + 1
(N − 1)t
(144)
≤ 2, (145)
where in the last step, we used the fact t ≥ 2 or N ≥ K + 2.
2) If N ≤ K, let q , 1− M
N
∈
[
0, 1− M
N
]
, then 1− M−1
N−1
= N
N−1
q. Hence,
R(M)
rD(M,N,K)
(131)
≤
rD(M − 1, N − 1, K)
rD(M,N,K)
(146)
=
N
N − 1
·
M
N
M−1
N−1
·
1−
(
1− M−1
N−1
)N−1
1−
(
1− M
N
)N (147)
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=
N
N − 1
·
1− q
1− N
N−1
q
·
1− ( N
N−1
)N−1qN−1
1− qN
(148)
=
N
N − 1
·
1 + N
N−1
q + . . .+
(
N
N−1
)N−2
qN−2
1 + q + . . .+ qN−1
(149)
≤
( N
N − 1
)N−1
·
1 + q + . . .+ qN−2
1 + q + . . .+ qN−1
(150)
≤
(
1 +
1
N − 1
)N−1
(151)
< e. (152)
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